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THE ARMY VS. THE INDIANS VS. THE SETTLERS: The 
South Florida Frontier Between the Seminole Wars 
 
 
Dr. Joe Knetsch 
 
One of the constant themes of Florida 
frontier history is the continued threat of 
violence. Either real or imagined, the threat 
of a painful death at the hands of unknown 
assailants, normally alleged to be Indians, 
loomed in the background of every 
settlement on the frontier. The acts of 
providing settlers with ammunition, 
weapons and constant patrols put the U.S. 
Army in the middle of all potential 
outbreaks. Therefore, any act, or reported 
act, of violence by the remaining Indian 
population had to be investigated, thwarted 
or rebuffed, and the settlers reassured that 
the incident was either false or isolated. The 
Army’s predicament on the southern frontier 
of Florida between the Second and Third 
Seminole Wars becomes obvious with the 
study of many of the remaining documents. 
There was, to be sure, some violence caused 
by Indians straying outside of the 1842 
boundary, however, some of the violence 
was not directly caused by this group but by 
whites hoping to manipulate the Army into a 
position of removing the remaining Indians, 
by force if necessary. 
 
The Armed Occupation Act of 1842, had not 
yet passed when new settlers began arriving 
in historic Manatee County. The most 
notable group was the colony of Colonel 
Samuel Reid, on the Manatee River. The 
well-connected Reid recruited from his 
fellow Middle-Floridians a colony of thirty-
two people (fifteen white males, ten black 
males, two black females and four black 
children) and settled on lands previously 
scouted on April 16, 1842. The colony was 
supplied with ten muskets, twenty musket 
flints and two hundred "Ball Buckshot & 
Cartridges." In reporting on the arrival of the 
colony, General William Worth commented: 
"the land is of Superior quality & from the 
character of the Gentlemen concerned, there 
is certainty of success."1 
 
The success of the Manatee colony was 
further assured by the arrival of other, some 
prominent, men from Middle Florida. They 
brought with them money, influence, 
connections to the political elite and some 
business acumen that many of Reid’s settlers 
did not have. The names of the Bradens, 
Gamble and others ring back the notable 
figures of early Manatee. As Janet Snyder 
Matthews has accurately recorded, this era 
also brought H. V. Snell, William Whitaker 
and Manuel Olivella into the land of historic 
Manatee County. This leadership core, 
including Reid, meant that the area was 
blessed with men of wisdom and 
connections which would allow the area to 
grow and prosper, even in the face of 
renewed Indian danger.2 
 
The end of the Second Seminole War did 
not, however, bring peace to the Florida 
frontier. The tensions between the U.S. 
Army, some of the settlers and the Indians 
remained to incite many plans, plots and acts 
of violence. Accounts of Indian-related 
violence appeared frequently in the 
newspapers of the young territory. On June 
13, 1843, for example, the Tallahassee 
Sentinel reported that in Alachua County: 
"Another Indian Outrage . . . We are all in 
arms again on account of the Indians." 
Wrote a correspondent from Newnansville, 
"On Monday, two Indians entered the house 
of Mr. Gideon Hague, situated near San 
Felasco Hammock, and, attacking his wife, 
left her for dead. Herself, child and a small 
negro girl were the only persons at home. 
The girl escaped with the child and gave the 
alarm to the family of Reuben Hague, 
residing about a half mile distant . . . "3 An 
attack that far north of the Manatee 
settlement, in an area supposedly safe from 
harm and devoid of Indians, increased the 
feeling of vulnerability for everyone on the 
frontier. Further afield, early the next year, 
on the waters of the Choctawhatchee Bay in 
the Florida Panhandle, the reports of further 
Indian massacres could not have set well 
with those concerned with the security of the 
exposed settlements further south.4 
 
The policy of the Federal Government at 
this time did not sit well with the settlers, 
who had hoped that the Army would finish 
the job of removing the last of Florida’s 
native population. In July of 1843, General 
William Worth, commanding in Florida, 
wrote the following to Major Wright, then 
commanding at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay: 
 
The Indians in Florida are permitted to 
reside temporarily in that portion of the 
Territory included within the red lines 
represented on the Map herewith 
furnished, where they are to remain and 
not to leave, except to visit this Post for 
the purpose of trading or other business. 
They are to keep at peace with the 
whites, and for depredations which may 
be done them by the whites, they are to 
complain here, where justice is to be 
done them; for depredations to them on 
the whites, their chief is to notice it by 
promptly punishing those of his people 
concerned . . . . There are but few 
Indians in the Territory and it is the 
desire of the Government, as soon as it 
can be done without the risk of renewing 
difficulties, to remove them West. To 
this they are greatly opposed and are 
suspicious of our wish to entrap them 
and force their removal. As long as they 
are suspicious, it will be difficult to carry 
out the wishes of the Government, but 
their suspicion may be gradually 
removed by constantly observing 
towards them an apparent indifference, 
making them no presents, asking few 
questions, respecting their people, never 
persuading them to visit here, and 
permitting them to purchase of the trader 
whatever they may wish and can pay 
cash for, including powder and whiskey 
for which written orders are given . . . A 
trader is appointed who is required to 
keep on hand all articles usually wanted 
by the Indians, to purchase their skins, to 
sell at reasonable prices and in all 
respects to deal fairly and honestly with 
them; the Commanding Officer will 
have to look to this matter frequently . . . 
In order to verify our information as to 
the number of male Indians the 
commander will keep a roll of all who 
may present themselves; this must be 
done without their observation as it may 
excite suspicions . . .5 
 
Thomas P. Kennedy was given many of the 
normal articles of trade from the Disbursing 
Agent, S. G. Capers, on August 10, 1843. 
These articles of trade included 2,000 
common "Sigars," 35 pounds of tobacco, 98 
Indian shawls, 32 camp kettles, 210 yards of 
calico, and numerous other articles, but, 
noticeably lacking in this list are powder and 
whiskey.6 The trade was to be carried on in 
Tampa, however, this arrangement soon 
became too risky for all parties and Kennedy 
opened his store on Charlotte Harbor. 
 
The Army also attempted to manipulate the 
Indians in the selection of a leader. It was 
thought that the old policy of divide and rule 
would benefit the policy of removal of the 
Indians to the west. Worth wrote to Colonel 
William Belknap on December 13, 1843, 
about his concerns with the policy, then 
being followed by the Colonel: "I have some 
doubts as to the policy of fermenting a 
rivalry between Bowlegs & Assinwah for 
the chieftancy; and simply because the one 
or the other might seek the ascendancy by a 
war movement - this doubt aside, a rupture 
between them would be our gain . . . On all 
these matters I can but thro out hints & 
suggestions as every movement must be the 
result of circumstances - where they indicate 
a decided course and time permit send me an 
extra express - on such occasions allow no 
letters to be sent except those that are private 
& official to my self or staff - thus only can 
we keep our operations duly secret."7 The 
policy was calculated to cause dissent and 
diversion, thus making the opportunity for 
the Army to deport the Indians west that 
much easier. Divided, the Indian leadership 
probably realized that the tribes stood little 
chance of remaining in Florida, therefore, in 
the long run, this policy did not work to the 
advantage of the Army. 
 
That settlers were moving into the southern 
portion of the territory and, especially, into 
the area of Charlotte Harbor was noted in a 
report of a scouting expedition by 
Lieutenant W. C. Browne. On May 24, 
1844, Browne wrote that "La Costa Grande" 
island was inhabited by five people trading 
with Mobile and New Orleans, via the 
schooner The Water Lilly, commanded by a 
Captain Berry, whose three children also 
lived with him on the island. A Captain 
Dewey, a New Englander, lived at "White 
Point" and near the head of Boca Grande, a 
certain gentleman named "Dexler" and a 
discharged soldier named Dunston lived by 
fishing and trapping under a company 
headed by Proceus, later a partner of John 
Darling in Tampa. Browne also noted the 
residence of Primo, described as a Spaniard, 
who lived on Pine Island and that an 
Irishman named MacKay and a citizen of 
Tampa named Stacks lived on "Matallachee 
Key" (Little Pine Island). He also noted that 
Sanibel and Captiva both had old 
settlements on them, but were unoccupied at 
the time.8 It is obvious that when Kennedy 
moved his store and trading post to the area, 
he was not alone and may not have been the 
only "trader" trading with the Indians. 
 
(Note: There is no corresponding endnote 8 
at the end of this essay) 
 
Rumors of war soon, however, began to 
rumble over the frontier of southwestern 
Florida. On August 5, 1844, General Worth 
wrote to his commander at Tampa, Captain 
Montgomery, the following: "I desire you to 
cause the enclosed communication to be 
forwarded with the least avoidable delay to 
Colonel Reid, by the Star, if at Tampa, and 
not urgently employed - instruct the 
messenger to await for Colonel Reid’s 
answers if he be found at his residence . . . I 
have further to desire that Mr. Kennedy, the 
Trader, and the Deputy Marshall, Mr. Ferris, 
may be sent to the residence of each settler 
on the Alafia, Simmons Hammock, 
Thlonotossassa, indeed all in the vicinity 
with a view to information on the following 
points . . . Have you in any instance been 
molested in person or property or in any way 
inconvenienced by the Indians since your 
residence’? Have you entertained or had 
good reason to entertain apprehension from 
these people? On their way to Tampa to 
trade, have they in any case been rude and 
insulting - or otherwise?" Worth also wanted 
information from Reid on the shape of the 
colony in respects to crops and "prospects 
generally."9 The reason for the urgent 
dispatches was an attempt by supporters of 
David Levy, then Delegate to Congress, to 
stir up rumors of a renewed Indian war. As 
Worth’s assistant, Captain John T. Sprague 
wrote to Montgomery: "Should it be known 
to citizens the object of this information was 
to disparage infamous reports to renew the 
war, fabricated by the Delegates friends, the 
information sought would in many instances 
be given with reluctance."10 On August 9, 
1844, Ferris and Kennedy were requested to 
perform their duty and ordered to return 
their responses to Fort Brooke.11 
 
Throughout the remainder of 1844 and into 
1845, the Army was busy putting down the 
rumors of war and trying to regulate trade 
with the Indians. Charlotte Harbor, close to 
the boundary of Indian territory, was an area 
of special concern because of the settlers 
and traders reported by Lieutenant Browne. 
There was even an attempt by the Territorial 
government to set up a customs office at that 
location, but this was opposed by General 
Worth and others.12 They were very 
concerned with removing the "intruders" 
who were already doing an illegal business 
in the vicinity.13 It comes as no surprise that 
the Army encouraged and provided for the 
moving of Kennedy’s store to Charlotte 
Harbor in early 1845. As Worth noted to 
Belknap: " . . . urge [upon the Indians] the 
advantage of a trading establishment on the 
waters of Charlotte Harbor & distinctly to 
understand that no trading can be allowed 
except by the regular trader we shall send 
there; that if any other whites go there, we 
shall send soldiers to remove them, the 
whites."14 
 
March 3, 1845, Florida was admitted to the 
Union as an equal state, and with it, new 
political forces arose to cause renewed 
friction between the three groups. The 
power of statehood which added two 
Senators and a member of Congress 
increased Florida’s political clout. This aug-
mented the pressures now being exerted by 
civilian authorities to get the Indian 
population removed. Florida’s first governor, 
William Moseley, was in constant 
correspondence with the Army officers in 
Florida and Washington during his years in 
that post. Writing, for example, to Captain 
John T. Sprague in St. Augustine, the 
governor stated: "I feel myself constrained 
to add that I am fearful the policy of the 
Government set forth in your 
communication will ultimately prove 
unsuccessful."15 Such was the tenor of the 
official correspondence coming from the 
new office of Governor of the State of 
Florida. 
 
The year 1845 also saw, again, renewed 
efforts by certain, unnamed individuals to 
spread the rumors of Indian troubles. Again, 
Worth wrote to Belknap; "The Indian story 
which you refer to & which I suppose you 
saw in the News was known to be false in 
every particular. Colo. Washing’n the 
Surveyor has just returned & denies every 
syllable of it - a drunken scoundrel of his 
party had come in and, as previously 
directed brought an ‘Indian Story.’ What a 
set of villains!"16 In one of the more telling 
letters of the Belknap correspondence, 
Worth let his feelings show to the fullest: 
"The St. Augustine News which I seen or 
read & have sworn I never will: but I am 
told it contains two most scurrilous & 
abusive articles or letters from Tampa of 
yourself & command. You have traitors in 
yr camp. I suspect the man Brown - 
Kennedy’s partner from the language quoted 
to me - as for instance ‘my wharf &’ the 
other Brown in my opinion or perhaps 
Byrne would not hesitate to do the same 
thing. It is known indeed avowed this News 
was bought up when Levy was here for the 
express purpose of attacking the Mily."17 
Indeed, the commanding general of the U.S. 
Army in Florida was accusing the Senator 
from the state of fomenting the constant 
attacks on the military by the local press; no 
clearer picture of the distrust between the 
political and military personnel in Florida 
could be drawn than that just quoted. 
 
The boundary set up to separate the Indians 
and whites was to be a twenty mile zone 
around the area designated as Indian 
Territory. Although the occupation of this 
area was to be of short term, no one knew 
exactly when the Indians would be ready to 
emigrate to the west. Roughly this area 
included much of the lower Peace River 
Valley over to the Kissimmee River and 
down it to Lake Okeechobee. At no point 
was there to be any territory recognized as 
Indian which had direct access to the ocean. 
The old fear of rearmament from Cuba or 
the Bahamas remained strongly embedded 
in the military and civilian mind. 
Interestingly, General Worth, upon seeing 
the area on a map from the Surveyor 
General of Florida, Valentine Conway, 
immediately expressed his displeasure with 
it, as it encompassed some lands already 
surveyed and settled upon by whites. 
Conway wrote to Washington for additional 
instructions and the corrected line was 
delineated on a new map.18 
 
But the problems still remained for the 
Army in patrolling the area and keeping the 
whites and Indians apart. The Indians, by 
almost all accounts, intended to remain 
peaceful and caused little trouble. John T. 
Sprague wrote to Captain .John H. Winder, 
commanding at Fort Brooke, on January 10, 
1846, that this was, indeed, the total intent 
of Bowlegs and his followers which he had 
learned at a meeting at Kennedy’s Charlotte 
Harbor store.19 Just two days after penning 
the above letter, Sprague again wrote to 
Winder, this time complaining of "intruders" 
with the Indians along the southwest coast. 
He claimed these intruders were 
"adventurers and speculators" who were idle 
and profligate and who were manufacturing 
"Indian signs" in hopes of exciting a new 
war, in the name of personal profit.20 
Keeping the "idle and profligate" from the 
Indian territory remained a major problem 
until the final outbreak of the Third 
Seminole War in 1855. 
 
That problems loomed with the civil 
authorities was behind much of the 
correspondence of 1846. Governor Moseley 
was in almost constant touch with Captain 
Aaron Jernigan who led the militia units in 
the area south of Fort Gatlin, in central 
Florida. From the correspondence between 
these two, it is obvious that the Indians were 
mistrusted and constantly "spied" upon and 
that the Government, represented in Florida 
by the Army, was viewed as weak regarding 
removal. On February 24, the Governor 
thanked Captain Sprague for his 
reassurances, "that no act of hostility need 
be apprehended from the Indians." However, 
he did not believe that the situation would 
remain so for long and noted that every 
incident reported would be followed up by 
Captain Jernigan or some other "responsible 
person."21 On the same day, he also wrote to 
Jernigan in a much stronger tone. "It is, I 
assure you Sir, a matter of deep regret to me; 
that these savages have not long since been 
removed west of the Mississippi. I am quite 
inclined to the opinion; per the information 
from Capt. Sprague; that no hostile attacks 
from them may be expected, nevertheless 
their residence among us, is well calculated 
to keep alive passions & prejudices which 
would doubtless long since have subsided, 
had they have been removed."22 These 
pieces of the general correspondence 
indicate that the State’s governor and his 
associates did not consider the policy 
advocated publicly by the Army as adequate 
to the situation. 
 
After constant reports of Indian 
depredations, various attacks on wagon 
masters, mail riders, etc., the general state of 
affairs continued to decline. Indians, it was 
reported, who had camped on Lake 
Istokpoga (Highlands County) had badly 
mistreated the negro of a Mr. Hancock.23 
Senator James D. Westcott of Florida wrote 
to President James K. Polk insisting that 
Captain Sprague had underestimated the size 
of the Seminole population greatly and that 
they were more powerful than the Army was 
willing to admit.24 Sprague, himself, was 
doubting the trustworthiness of the 
Seminoles and wrote to William Medill of 
the Department of Indian Affairs that they 
were, "more subtle, or vindictive, and 
inimical to the whites," than any other tribe 
in the United States.25 Trader John Darling, 
soon to enter into a partnership with Thomas 
Kennedy, wrote from the Charlotte Harbor 
store: "I have been some time at this station 
as agent for the Seminole Trader trading 
with the Indians, and I have seen enough of 
them to induce me to think that the policy at 
present pursued by the General Government, 
if the purpose is removal, ought to be 
changed." He then continues and directly 
attacks Captain John Casey: "The Indians 
are now permitted and encouraged to go out 
of the Reservation for the purpose of trade, 
ostensibly, but in reality to enable the 
Seminole Agent to keep up a quasi 
communication with them without personal 
inconvenience to himself. You are aware 
that the present Agent is an officer in the 
United States Army, and in command of 
troops at Fort Brooke."26 These 
representative reports and observations 
continued to fan the flames of possible war 
on the Florida frontier, and the motives of 
those involved did not appear pure and 
devoid of personal interest.27 
 
The great Indian Scare of 1849 brought out 
more intense passions and tensions on the 
Florida frontier. The murders on Indian 
River and at Paynes Creek heightened the 
call for renewed warfare against the 
Seminoles and Miccosukees. The scare 
depopulated the Indian River settlements, 
the New River Settlement and much of that 
originally found on the Miami River. In a 
word, it nearly depopulated southeastern 
Florida and made the impact of the Armed 
Occupation Act nearly void in that region.28 
 
The impact on the Sarasota-Manatee area 
was also devastating at first. As Janet 
Snyder Matthews has written, the 
settlements were in a panic and a meeting 
was called to discuss the matter and decide 
on the appropriate course of action. 
Volunteer units were called up by the 
Governor and H. V. Snell, and Joseph 
Woodruff, of Sarasota Bay, signed up to 
serve under Manatee merchant, Henry S. 
Clark, although this unit was not officially 
mustered into service. Unfortunately, the 
Army sent a Lieutenant J. Gibbon to 
reassure the settlers that all was well. His 
men, however, appeared at the Manatee 
settlements on "ordinary draft mules" and 
presented anything but a quick response unit 
capable of delaying or destroying attacking 
Indians.29 Captain John C. Casey, in writing 
to Adjutant General R. Jones, noted that his 
guides had found the usual signal for a peace 
parlance, a white flag made of feathers and 
tobacco with white beads, left by the Indians 
on an elevated point on Sarasota Bay.30 His 
commanding officer, Brevet Major General 
D. E. Twiggs, an old veteran of the Indian 
Wars, wrote on August 27, 1849: 
 
Some days previous to my arrival a 
white flag was found at Sarasota, as has 
already been reported to the department 
by Captain Casey. Yesterday I sent a 
company to the Manitu river. On 
reaching the district bordering on the 
river, from which the inhabitants fled, 
two white flags were found at Mr. 
Addison’s, at the head of the river, and 
signs of the tracks of two ponies. 
Nothing had been injured on the 
premises, and nothing but a few pounds 
of flour taken from the house; 
indications from which something 
favorable may be hoped, in the expected 
meeting of Captain Casey and the 
chiefs.31 
 
This revealing passage indicates that the 
settlers on the Manatee had, like most others 
in the exposed positions, left for the safety 
of the nearest fortifications. Indeed, as early 
as July 25, 1849, just four days after the 
Payne’s Creek murders, Casey noted in his 
diary, "people forting."32 
 
By September 6, 1849, Casey was reporting 
to his superior officer, Major W. W. 
Mackall, that he had heard from Bowlegs 
and that the latter regretted the recent 
murders and that every effort would be 
made by the tribe to bring the guilty parties, 
whom were identified as five young 
Seminoles from the Kissimmee River area, 
to justice as soon as possible. Casey also 
noted that Sam Jones had contacted Bowlegs 
urging him to take the lead in keeping the 
peace with the whites. Casey then reported 
the good news, that the guilty parties had 
been overtaken on their way to the 
settlements by Chitto Hajo. The Captain 
stated: "The chiefs all disavow and regret 
these murders; and all the Indians are averse 
to hostilities. They are satisfied with their 
country, and with the treaty under which 
they are living; and they now earnestly 
desire to do justice in this matter." Broken 
sticks were exchanged at the end of the 
September 18-19th conference and peace 
soon prevailed again on the frontier.33 
Casey’s efforts to meet with Bowlegs and 
resolve the problems met with great success 
and at no time did he bring up the question 
of removal. Yet, he was deeply troubled by 
the knowledge that General David Twiggs 
would bring up emigration at the next 
conference, calling this an, "apparent breach 
of faith."34 
 
In his remarkable letters from the Florida 
frontier, Brevet-Major John C. Pemberton 
reported that the subject of removal was 
brought up with Bowlegs at the next 
conference. Twiggs traveled to Charlotte 
Harbor in mid-October to personally receive 
the prisoners who had perpetrated the 
murders on Indian River and Payne’s Creek. 
He took into custody three live prisoners, the 
hand of another (killed while attempting to 
escape) and a promise to capture the fifth 
culprit. After securing the prisoners, Twiggs 
brought up the eminent emigration, to which 
the Indians "expressed great surprise & 
showed great sorrow." Having just 
demonstrated their desire and faithfulness to 
the cause of peace, this reaction is 
understandable. Pemberton struck the final 
note by observing that the remainder would 
now resist any attempt at removal and 
predicted a "long and wearisome war" 
before they would finally capitulate.35 
 
The reports of violence on the frontier 
continued, however, to flow back to the 
Governor, now Thomas Brown. One of the 
typical letters read like the following: 
 
Sir, rumors say the Indian hostilities has 
been recommenced. Six waggons or 
teamsters has been Killed on Rout from 
Fort Mellon to Fort Frazer on the 
Kissimmee the truth I cant vouch for but 
I fear it is tru for the Indians has not met 
Gen Twiggs. Sir I merely request that 
you would commission me and Lieut 
William Kendrick Lieut Horn has left 
the Dist.36 
 
Indeed, the frequent reports of violence to 
teamsters, mail riders, etc., lead one to 
wonder about the political machinations 
going on along the frontier, especially when 
the rewards were a captaincy or some other 
officer’s rank in the local militia. Some, like 
John Darling, actually were reported to have 
attempted to thwart negotiations, but were 
stopped by cooler heads.37 
 
The immediate result of the Indian Scare of 
1849, was the establishment of a line of 
fortifications, if they can be called such, 
along the southern frontier. Camp Gamble 
was occupied near the Gamble plantation on 
the north side of the river and another unit 
was stationed at Dr. Braden’s place on the 
south side. Little was done from these 
"posts" and the incidents of the earlier part 
of the year were soon over and life went 
ahead. In some instances, soldiers were 
simply put up in local homes and 
plantations, such as those reported by 
Brevet-Major Pemberton. The Major’s wife 
gave birth to a ten-pound baby girl just 
shortly after leaving the house of a 
"Presbyterian parson" whose house was the 
last one of the Manatee River settlement.38 
The panic, which had been complete at one 
stage of the Scare, did not fade from the 
memories of those who lived through it and 
caution was now the watchword for 
everyone.39 
 
The political leaders, although happy at the 
end of the immediate crisis, wanted more 
troops deployed, hoping to entice the final 
battles that would lead to removal. In this 
hope they were disappointed. On August 7, 
1849, Secretary of War George Crawford, 
wrote to the Governor, "I think that the force 
which is in process of being placed on the 
Southern Settlements of the Peninsula, will 
be adequate to their full defense. That force, 
when assembled, will, in numerical 
Strength, be quadruple that of the Indians. 
You propose to raise a force, which would 
be greater than the entire force of the 
Indians. I confess I do not see the propriety 
or necessity of employing the volunteers of 
Florida, and without which, I could not 
advise the President to muster them in the 
Service of the United States." This letter 
effectively ended the hope at that time of 
raising the troops for the final push.40 
 
The outline of a plan by the Army for 
securing the frontier settlements, of course, 
had already been in the works. On October 
3, 1849, this plan was sent to Washington by 
General Twiggs. Again, the central role of 
the Manatee settlements comes out clearly in 
this document. "Preparatory to a movement 
into the Indian country," Twiggs wrote, "I 
would make every effort to secure the 
frontier settlements against an eruption of 
the savages. To do this, I should propose a 
line of posts from the Manatee to the Indian 
river, passing between Kissimmee on the 
South and Cypress lake on the north. On this 
line of 200 miles, posts of two companies 
each, 10 miles apart, would be required, 
making 40 companies. Also depots at 
Miami, New and Indian rivers, St. John’s on 
the east, Manatee, Charlotte Harbor and 
Caloosahatchee, on the western side of the 
peninsula. . ." Twiggs also noted that the 
garrisons would comprise about thirteen 
companies, including a mounted force of 
300 men. He continued by detailing the type 
of boats to be used in Florida’s shallow 
creeks and rivers. The naval force, as used in 
the last war, was not efficient enough and 
would not be needed. Fighting the Indians of 
Florida, who gave no pitched battles and 
fled at the approach of every force, Twiggs 
declared, "Your numbers, then, must make 
up for his intelligence and fleetness."41 The 
plan, it is clear, was similar to one 
developed toward the end of the Second 
Seminole War by General Worth. 
 
Throughout the 1850s, until the outbreak of 
the Third Seminole War in 1855, the 
tensions continued to mount. A general 
policy of continued pressure on the Indians 
was fully implemented. The U.S. Deputy 
Surveyors were ordered into the "neutral 
ground" to lay out public lands as a signal to 
the Indians that civilization, as the whites 
knew it, would soon be encroaching on their 
land.42 The Army continuously sent in 
reconnaissance missions (called surveys by 
some) to map out the hiding places and 
growing fields of the Indians. Lieutenant 
Hartsuff was on one such mission when his 
troops were attacked, beginning the last of 
the Seminole Wars. The State legislature 
regularly passed bills prohibiting trade with 
the Indians and resolutions calling for 
immediate removal. The Third Seminole 
War was no accident. It was a fully 
contrived exercise of continual pressure to 
force the final issue of removal. Few on the 
South Florida frontier were surprised when 
the war finally did come; most, it may be 
assumed, were relieved. 
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